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IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA or the Act 1 is a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the management of investment
companies.2 Congress intended the Act to regulate and restrict the inter15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979). The Supreme Court stated in Burks that
the Investment Company Act (ICA or the Act) is not a source of authority for managerial
power but instead controls and restricts the management of investment companies. Id. The
Act is a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the actions of those in control of investment companies. SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 42 (7th Cir. 1972).
The provisions of the ICA regulate investment companies, which the Act defines as
issuers engaged in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in
securities. Investment Company Act of 1940, S 3(a), 15 U.S.C. S 80a-3(a) (1976); see 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2(a)(22) (issuer defined as natural person or company that issues or proposes to issue
a security); id. § 80a-2(a)(36) (security defined). Investment companies include mutual funds
and money market funds. The Act exempts certain companies from investment company
status. See id. §§ 80a-3(b), (c). Among the exemptions are holding companies whose primary
business is not that of investing or trading in securities, underwriters, brokers, dealers,
banks, insurance companies, loan companies, factors, persons engaged in holding or owning
oil and mineral royalties, eleemosynary organizations, and certain trusts. See id.
The Act requires registration of investment companies and sets forth procedures for
registration. Id. § 80a-8. A company that registers under the Act must file notification of
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) and must
conform to any rules and regulations prescribed by the SEC. Id. S 80a-8. The Act prohibits
an unregistered investment company from engaging in any activity related to the business
of an investment company. Id. § 80a-7.
Investment companies also must comply with reporting requirements designed to provide the SEC, investors, and the public with information concerning the company's financial and investment policies and activities. Motley, Jackson & Bernard, FederalRegulation
of Investment Companies Since 1940, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1134,1140 (1950) [hereinafer cited as
Motley The Act requires an investment company to file registration statements that disclose
the company's investment policy and the character of its investments. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 8(b)(2), (3), 15 U.S.C. S 80a-8(b)(2), (3) (1976). Furthermore, the Act requires investment companies to file annual reports with the SEC and sets standards for
accounts, reports, and statements with which the investment company must comply. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-29 to 80a-34. The SEC may suspend or revoke registration of companies
for misstatements made in registration materials. Id. § 80a-8(e). Investment companies may
not change investment policies without express authorization from the investors. Id. S 80a-13.
The ICA also governs the internal structure of investment companies and regulates
the activities of companies' affiliates. Id. §§ 80a-8 to 80a-10, 80a-14 to 80a-18. The Act regulates
the internal structure of an investment company by setting limits on size, id. § 80a-14,
capital structure, id. § 80a-18, and the makeup of the board of directors, id. S80a-16, imposing restrictions on use of interested directors, id. § 80a-10, and requiring certain personnel
to serve pursuant to a written contract, id. § 80a-15. The Act restricts activities by affiliates, id. § 80a-17, requires disclosure of affiliates in registration materials, id: § 80a-8,
and prohibits affiliates who make misleading statements or engage in other prohibited acts
from associating in any capacity with an investment company, id. S 80a-9.
A number of substantive provisions of the ICA impose specific prohibitions and limitations on the dealings and operations of investment companies. Id. SS 80a-7, 80a-11 to 80a-12,
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nal operations of investment companies' in an effort to protect investors4
and eliminate abusive practices by investment companies.' The Act was
a product of congressional concern that the existing securities laws were
inadequate to protect purchasers of investment company securities.'
Congress empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (SECY
to bring actions to enforce the provisions of the ICA,8 and granted an
80a-18 to 80a-28. The Act prohibits an investment company from engaging in business as
an investment company without complying with registration requirements. Id. S 80a-7. The
Act regulates offers to exchange securities and limits the functions and activities in which
an investment company may participate. See id. §§ 80a-11 to 80a-12. The Act also governs
the company's financial structure, including its debt position, stock sales, and loan transactions. See id. §§ 80a-18 to 80a-28. Any qualifying investment company may elect to have
additional regulations govern the company's activities as a business development company.
Id. S 80a-5; see id. §5 80a-54 to 80a-64. The Act empowers the Securities and Exchange
Commission to enforce all provisions of the ICA. Id. § 80a-41; see infra note 7 and accompanying text (SEC discussed). The Act attempts to regulate the structure, management, and
activities of investment companies rather than regulate the sale of securities. Motley, supra,
at 1142.
' Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979); see supra note 2 (specific regulations of ICA).
First Multifund for Daily Income, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 332, 333-34 (Ct.
Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980). The Act was the result of Congress' belief that
the securities laws existing prior to the ICA were inadequate to protect purchasers of investment company securities. Id. The fundamental purpose of the Act was to protect investors. Id.; Independent Investor Protective League v. SEC, 495 F.2d 311, 312 (2d Cir.
1974); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 816 (5th Cir. 1970; see Investment Company Act
of 1940, § 1, 15 U.S.C. S 80a-1 (1976) (policy of ICA is to eliminate conditions that adversely
affect national public interest and interest of investors).
I SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1972); Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 816 (5th Cir. 1970). One of the abuses the Act attempts to prevent
is self-dealing, the practice of using investments for personal benefit by persons managing
and controlling investment companies. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1320-21
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 111 (1977); Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 373 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). Other abuses the Act addresses include breach of
fiduciary duty, use of funds for unauthorized purposes, and misrepresentations to investors.
See Investment Company Act of 1940, §§9, 13, 36, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-9, 80a-13, 80a-35 (1976);
see also supra note 2 (ICA regulations).
' First Multifund for Daily Income, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 332, 333-34 (Ct.
Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980).
' See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1976). The SEC consists of five commissioners, appointed by the President, who serve staggered terms of five
years each. Id. Congress established the Commission to enforce the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and transferred to the Commission powers to enforce the Securities Act of
1933 previously granted to the Federal Trade Commission. See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, SS 4, 210, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d, 78ii (1976) (§ 78ii omitted from official Code). Congress
later gave the SEC power to enforce provisions of the other securities laws. See infra note
17 (securities laws). In addition to enforcement powers, Congress gave the Commission broad
authority to formulate rules for administering the securities acts. L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1936-37 (2d ed. 1961). For a detailed discussion of the SEC's organization, powers,
and procedures, see generally id. at 1877-2015.
' Investment Company Act of 1940, 5 36(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1976). The Act allows
the SEC to bring an action against an officer, director, advisory board member, adviser,
depositor or principal underwriter of a registered investment company for any act of per-

1983]

IMPLIED ACTIONS UNDER ICA

1071

express private right of action in one instance.9 Section 36(b) provides a
cause of action for any security holder of a registered investment company against an adviser or affiliate of the company for recovery of excessive fees. 10 Apart from the section 36(b) private cause of action,11 Congress failed to provide an express remedy for individuals injured by a
violation of the regulatory sections of the ICA.12 A question that the
Supreme Court has yet to decide is whether the ICA implies a private

right of action for investors against investment companies for damages
resulting from violations of the Act." In spite of a recent restrictive trend
by the Supreme Court in the area of implied rights of action," an inference

that a private right exists under the ICA is appropriate by current
Supreme Court standards."
Implied private rights of action long have been recognized at comsonal misconduct constituting breach of fiduciary duty. Id. The SEC may seek to enjoin
the person charged with breach of a fiduciary duty from acting in any affiliation with an
investment company. Id. The federal court in which the action is brought also may grant
such other relief as is reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances. Id.
Investment Company Act of 1940, S 36(b), 15 U.S.C. S 80a-35(b) (1976).
10 Id. Section 36(b) imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers and affiliates with
regard to fees paid for services by investment companies or individual investors. Id. The
fiduciary duty is based solely on compensation or payments and not on any act of personal
misconduct. Id. S 80a-35(b)(1). Parties may bring an action under S 36(b) only against a recipient of compensation or payments. Id. S 80a-35(b)(3). The action does extend, however, to
fees paid by the company or any of the company's security holders. Id. S 80a-35(b). The
express right of action extends not only to individual investors but also to the SEC. Id.
In addition to the express right of security holders and the SEC, some courts infer
a cause of action under 5 36(b) for the investment company itself. See Weiss v. Temporary
Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 936 (3d Cir. 1982) (S 36(b) implied right of action in favor
of investment company against advisers); Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 557 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (under analysis established by Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), 5
36(b) implies right of action for mutual fund); cf. Untermeyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust,
79 F.R.D. 36, 45-46 & n.30 (D. Mass.) (when mutual fund precluded from bringing S 36(b)
action, fund had common-law right of action against adviser), vacated on other grounds, 580
F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1978). But see Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1982)
(no action implied for mutual fund), cert. granted,51 U.S.L.W. 3646 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1983); Boyko
v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 695-96 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same). See generally Note,
The DemandRequirement and Mutual FundAdvisory Fee Suits: An Incompatible Combination?, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1091, 1106-11 (1983) (concluding no implied investment company
right of action exists under S 36(b)).
11Investment Company Act of 1940, S 36(b), 15 U.S.C. S 80a-35(b) (1976); see supranotes
9-10 and accompanying text (express right of action for breach of fiduciary duty regarding
fees).
12 See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. SS 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981); supra note 2 (regulatory provisions of ICA).
11Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Burks v. Lasker, 441
U.S. 471, 476 (1979) (Supreme Court assumed without deciding that implied action existed
under ICA).
" See infra notes 25-62 and accompanying text (discussion of cases limiting implied
rights of action).
15 See infra notes 115-61 and accompanying text (current analysis of implied right of
action issue applied to ICA).
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mon law."6 Soon after enactment of the federal securities laws, 7 courts
began inferring private remedies for the statutes' intended beneficiaries
when the statutes failed expressly to deny such remedies. 8 The decisions
adopted the premise that violation of regulatory legislation created a
private right of action in favor of members of the class of persons a statute
intended to protect. 9 In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,'° the Supreme Court inferred a private damage action in favor of a shareholder who received
misleading proxy materials in violation of section 14(a) of the Securities
V ' The Court noted that the possibility of
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act).
civil damages or injunctive relief serves as an effective tool in enforceKaplan, Implied Causes of Action, 8 LITIGATION, Summer 1982, at 33,33 [hereinafter
cited as Kaplan]; see Maher, Implied PrivateRights ofAction and the FederalSecuritiesLaws:
A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 783,786-87 (1980) (background of implied
rights at common law). An early case in the history of implied rights of actions involved
an injury which resulted from a violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. Texas &
Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 40 (1916). In Rigsby, the Supreme Court allowed the injured
railway employee to sue the railroad for failure to comply with the Safety Appliance Act.
Id. at 39-40. Cases, treatises, and restatements of the law have recognized the practice
of inferring private rights of action from regulatory or criminal statutes. J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D.
1

Pa. 1946); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S 36 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].

Authorities reason that the practice results from court attempts to further the purposes
or policies of legislation ultimately designed to benefit or protect individuals. J.I. Case,
377 U.S. at 432; PROSSER. supra,S 36; RESTATEMENT, supra, 5 286 comment d.
17 The ICA was one in a series of securities laws that Congress enacted to eliminate
abuses in the securities industry. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 816 (5th Cir. 1970). Other
legislation in the securities area included the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act), 15 U.S.C.
SS 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. V 1981); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), 15 U.S.C.
SS 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. V 1981); the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15
U.S.C. SS 79 to 79z-6 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
SS 77aaa-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. V 1981); the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA), 15
U.S.C. SS 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); and the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. SS 78aaa-78eee (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
18 See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 872 (2d Cir. 1977) (action implied under
S 206 of IAA), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d
783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951) (private action for fraud inferred from S 10(b) of '34 Act); Goldstein
v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir.) (action implied under Public Utilities Holding Company Act), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir.)
(Clark, J., dissenting in part) (implied action available under S 6(b) of '34 Act), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 737 (1944); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 cEJD. Pa. 1946)
(defrauded shareholders given right of action for damages under S 10(b) of '34 Act); Geismar
v. Bond & Goodman, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (implied action under 5 29
of '34 Act). The decisions in implication cases turned on the necessity of supplementing
the statutes' regulatory provisions with remedies that effectively protected individuals injured by violations and promoted the purpose of the legislation. See generally Maher, supra
note 16, at 789-93.
19 Kaplan, supra note 16, at 33; see Maher, supra note 16, at 786-87 (reasons for implication); supra note 18 (cases inferring rights of action from securities laws).
10377 U.S. 426 (1964).
1 Id. at 433-34. In J.L Case Co. v. Borak, a shareholder, Borak, brought a suit to enjoin
merger of J.I. Case with another company on grounds of breach of fiduciary duty and self-
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ment of regulatory provisions.' The Court also found the circumstances
surrounding solicitation of proxies to warrant enforcement measures
beyond SEC action." As the justification for the J.L Case decision to allow
a private damage action, the Court concluded that private actions were
a necessary supplement to actions the '34 Act allowed the SEC to bring.'
Showing reluctance to expand access to the federal court system,'
the Supreme Court began retreating from the early stance favoring liberal
inference of private remedies.26 Recent decisions have altered the process
by which courts determine existence of an implied private right of action
under a federal statuteY In the 1975 decision of Cort v. Ash,' the Supreme
Court attempted to restrict the prior expansive doctrine of implication
by establishing a new standard for implication of rights of action.' In Cort,
a corporate stockholder brought an action for damages for an alleged violation of a criminal statute by corporate officials.' Finding that the legislative
dealing by company directors and misrepresentations in proxy materials. Id. at 429. Borak
alleged that materials circulated in solicitation of proxies for use in voting on the proposed
merger were false and misleading in violation of S 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ('34 Act). Id. Seeking to have the Court void the merger, Borak also brought an
action for damages resulting from the alleged violation of S 14(a). Id. at 430. The Supreme
Court found that Congress intended the remedial provisions of § 14(a) to protect investors.
See id. at 431-32. Furthermore, the Court held that the purpose of protecting investors
implies a remedy through judicial relief. See id. at 432.
2

Id.

See id. at 433.
See id.
Kaplan, supra note 16, at 34.
See id. The Supreme Court recently noted that increased complexity of legislation
and increased volume of litigation compel careful scrutiny of the implied right of action
question. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1838-39
(1982); see The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 62,236-37 n.1 (1982) (recent restriction of earlier trend allowing private actions to further purposes of statutes) [hereinafter
cited as 1981 Term]; see also Maher, supra note 16 (discussion of future of implied rights
of action). During the last decade, the Court has restricted inferences of private rights of
action from federal legislation. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1975) (implied right denied
under criminal statute), National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453, 465 (1974) (no additional private remedy implied by § 307(a) of Rail Passenger
Service Act of 1970); see also supra notes 16-24, infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text
(earlier court policy of liberal inference of private rights of action).
I See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1844
(1982) (private right of action implied under Commodity Exchange Act); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (private remedy denied under S 206
of Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578
(1979) (private right of action denied under S17(a) of '34 Act); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979) (remedy implied by title IX of Education Amendments of 1972);
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1975) (private right not implied under criminal statute);
infra notes 28-85 (discussion of changes in Supreme Court rationale in implied right of action cases).
2 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
See id. at 78.
Id. at 68. The plaintiff in Cort sought damages for a violation of a federal criminal
statute that proscribed corporate contributions or expenditures to political campaigns. Id.;
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history and purpose of the statute precluded implication of a right of
action,"' the Court announced four factors relevant to determinations of
the existence of implied rights of action 2 First, a court must determine
whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit Congress
passed the statute.' Second, the court must examine the legislative history
of the statute in question to determine whether Congress intended, explicitly or implicitly, to create or deny a private remedy.' Third, the court
must determine whether implication of the private right of action is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme. 5 Finally,
the court must decide if the remedy is one traditionally relegated to state
law and thus inappropriate if based solely on federal law.16 By discounting the significance of whether implication of a private remedy promotes
the statute's purposes, the Cort rationale retreated from the Supreme
Court's earlier liberal implication philosophy that relied solely on the
statutory purpose factor. 7 During the years immediately following the
see 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1948), repealed by Federal Elections Campaign Act, Pub. L. 94-283, title
II, S 201(a) (1976).
", See 422 U.S. at 69.

' Id. at 78.
' Id.; see Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (plaintiff must be
member of class for whose benefit statute enacted). In Cart, the Supreme Court found that
a criminal statute may create a special group of protected individuals. See 422 U.S. at 80.
Finding that Congress did not intend the statute involved in Cart to protect a class of
shareholders, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to meet the first part of the test announced in Crt. See id. at 82.
422 U.S. at 78. The Supreme Court in Crt found no evidence from the legislative
history of the statute at issue that Congress intended to give shareholders a private damage
remedy under the statute. See id. The Court noted that when a federal law protects a certain class of persons, see supra note 33, no affirmative showing of intent to create the right
of action is necessary. 422 U.S. at 82. However, an express legislative intent to deny a
private remedy controls. Id.
422 U.S. at 78. In Cort, the Supreme Court relied on J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964), in stating that the courts must provide remedies necessary to give effect to
legislative goals. 422 U.S. at 83; see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (J.L Case
discussed). Rather than being the key element in a determination that a statute implies
a private remedy as in J.L Case, the Cort test makes the element of necessity of the remedy
in light of the legislative purpose simply one of four factors. See 422 U.S. at 84; J.L Case,
377 U.S. at 433. The Court held that the remedy sought in Crt would not satisfy the third
factor of the four-part test because the private remedy did not aid the congressional goal
of the criminal statute in question. See 422 U.S. at 84. Recent Supreme Court decisions
have discounted the use of statutory purpose as a basis for inference of private remedies.
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 29 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979); infra notes 40-60 and accompanying text (Transamericaand Touche Ross discussed).
' 422 U.S. at 78. Because state law governs corporate activities and may create a
fiduciary duty regarding the use of corporate funds, the Court held the questioned activity
in Cart within the scope of state law remedies and denied a federal right of action. See id. at 85.
, See id. at 78. After Cart, giving effect to the statutory purpose became one of four
criteria rather than the principal factor in an implication decision. Id.; see J.I. Case v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (earlier implication decision based on necessity of effectuating con-
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Cort decision, however, courts continued to recognize implied rights of
action under federal legislation.- Furthermore, the courts inferring private
rights of action generally made the inference on the basis of the four-part
test of Cort. 9
The cases of Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington"° and TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis4' narrowed the Supreme Court's approach to
implied private rights of action by emphasizing the importance of a single
factor, congressional intent.42 In Touche Ross, the trustee of a liquidated
corporation brought an action for damages against an accounting firm for
violations of section 17(a) of the '34 Act. 43 The Supreme Court did not give
equal weight to the four factors set forth in Cort, 4 and instead limited
the inquiry to an analysis of congressional intent.45 Finding that section
gressional purposes}, supra note 35 (discussion of third factor of Cort test); Maher, supra
note 16, at 783-85 (discussion of historical approach to implied private rights of action).
11See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 741-42 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted that in the four years following the Cort decision, at least twenty
decisions in courts of appeals found implied rights of action. Id. at 741; see, e.g., Local 714,
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978)
(S 13(c) of Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964); Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223 (7th
Cir. 1978) (S 1007(a) of Federal Aviation Act of 1958); Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579
(9th Cir. 1978) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act); Davis v. Southeastern Community
College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978) (§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Abrahamson
v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977) (S 206 of IAA), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978);
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 568 F.2d
478 (6th Cir. 1977) (§ 11(e) of Federal Home Loan Bank Act); Wilson v. First Houston Inv.
Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978) (§ 206 of IAA); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre,
558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (S 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Nedd v. United Mine Workers,
556 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1977) (S 302 of Labor Management Relations Act, 1947), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
s' See California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1784 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Justice Rehnquist noted in Sierra Club that five of the previous six implied right of action
cases before the Supreme Court resulted in reversals of decisions based on Cort analysis.
Id. In UniversitiesResearchAss'n v. Coutu, the Court reversed a decision inferring a private
right of action for back wages under the Davis-Bacon Act, 50 U.S.C. SS276a to 276a-7 (1976).
101 S. Ct. 1451, 1461 (1981). The Seventh Circuit in Coutu had employed a strict Cort approach but concluded that a private remedy existed for laborers and mechanics under the
act. McDaniel v. University of Chicago, 548 F.2d 689, 692-95 (7th Cir. 1977). Justice Rehnquist later criticized courts for mechanical application of the Cort analysis, noting Cort's
failure to lend consistency to implication decisions. California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct.
1775, 1784 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
'0 422 U.S. 560 (1979).
" 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
'" See Transamerica,444 U.S. at 24; Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578.
' 442 U.S. at 566. In Touche Ross, the trustee, Redington, charged that officers of
Weis Securities, Inc., conspired to conceal operating losses by falsifying reports that S 17(a)
required to be filed. Id. at 565. The trustee also alleged that Touche Ross & Co., a firm
of certified public accountants retained by Weis, conducted audits and improperly certified
Weis' financial condition in annual reports required by 5 17(a) and in questionnaires required by the New York Stock Exchange of member firms. Id. at 563-66.
" See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (four-part test of Cort).
'5 442 U.S. at 568, 578. The Touche Ross Court asserted that the ultimate issue in im-
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17(a) of the '34 Act conferred no remedial privileges, the Court denied
implication of a private right of action.4 The Court discussed the first
three of the four Cort factors,47 but found that the statute granted no express private rights to a class of people nor proscribed any conduct.48 The
Court further noted that the legislative history indicated no express or
implied congressional intent to create a private remedy. 4 Relying on
legislative intent portions of the Cort test,5 the Court refused to infer
right of action in the absence of the requisite congressional
a private
1
intent.5
Transamericareinforced Supreme Court reliance on the congressional
intent approach to implication questions.2 Relying on Touche Ross, the
Court reaffirmed that the ultimate consideration in determining whether
a court should infer a private right of action is congressional intent to
create a private remedy.5 In an action brought against the investment
advisers of a trust for fraud committed in violation of section 206 and
section 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,1 the Court emphaplication decisions is not whether the court can improve the statutory scheme by granting
a private right of action but whether Congress intended the legislation to imply a right
of action. Id. at 578. In determining congressional intent, the question is one of statutory
construction. Id. at 568. The Court looked first at the language of the statute and found
no basis in § 17(a) of the '34 Act for inferring a civil cause of action. See id. at 568-71. The
Court then looked to the legislative history of the statute and again found no intent to
create a private right of action. See id. at 571-74.
6 See id. at 570-71. The Touche Ross Court discussed the relevance of congressional
silence on intent to create a private remedy and held that absence of any indication of
intent to create the right reinforces the arguments against inference of the right of action.
See id. at 571. Noting express grants of damage remedies under other sections, the Court
deemed Congress' omission of such a remedy from S 17(a) to be inconsistent with an inference of a private right by the Court. Id. at 571-74. The Touche Ross approach in interpreting congressional silence departed from earlier notions favoring an inference of a right
of action when Congress failed to address the issue. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 698-99 (1981).
11 Id. at 575-76; see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (first three factors of
Cort test).
See 422 U.S. at 576.
"' Id. at 575-76.
0 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (Cort factors).
51 See 422 U.S. at 576. The Touche Ross Court modified the Cort test. See id. at 575.
Rather than consider the four Cort criteria equally, the Court instead created a two-tier
inquiry. See id. The first level is an evaluation of congressional intent, and the second is
an analysis of whether federal or state law controls. Id. Finding that Touche Ross failed
to satisfy the first tier under the first three Cort factors, the Court did not address the
second part of the inquiry. Id. at 575-76.
Transamerica,444 U.S. at 15-16.
5 Id.
- Id. at 13, 16. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA) was companion legislation
to the ICA. Id. at 20; see 15 U.S.C. §5 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 206
of the IAA prohibits acts by investment advisers which are fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, S 206, 15 U.S.C. S 80b-6; see Transamerica,
444 U.S. at 16-17 n.6. In the action based on S 206, the shareholder in Transamericasought
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sized reliance on statutory construction.5 The Court, however, discounted

the importance of a finding that implication effectuates the purposes of
the statute"' or that Congress intended the statute to benefit a particular
class of people. 7 The Court instead limited its examination to the question of whether Congress intended to create a private remedy. 8 Analyzing section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act in this light,59 the Court
found no legislative intent to create a private right of action for damages.'
Although the Supreme Court continues to follow the Touche Ross and
Transawmericaapproach in implication decisions,8 a 1982 application of the
restitution of fees, an accounting for illegal profits, and an award of damages. 444 U.S. at 14.
In another allegation, the shareholder sought injunctive relief to restrain performance
of an advisory contract and rescission of the contract. Id. The shareholder asserted that
the contract at issue was void under § 215 of the IAA, which makes invalid any contracts
entered in violation of IAA provisions. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, S 215, 15 U.S.C.
S 80b-15; see 444 U.S. at 17 n.7.
See 444 U.S. at 15.
See id. The TransamericaCourt followed the approach of Touche Ross and Cort in
limiting the reliance on the J.L Case statutory purposes basis for inferring a private right
of action. See id.; supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (J.L Case discussed).
" 444 U.S. at 24. Congress intended 5 206 of the IAA to protect the victims of fraudulent
practices, but the TransamericaCourt held that this purpose did not require an inference
of a private cause of action. Id. When, as the Court concluded in Transamerica,Congress
did not intend to create such a remedy, the Court will not infer one from the statute. See id.
See id. at 15-16.
" See id. at 16-22. The TransamericaCourt first looked at the statutory language and
found that Congress intended the sections in question, § 206 and S 215, to benefit clients
of investment advisers. See id. at 16-17; supra note 54 (discussion of S 206 and S 215 and
allegations based on violations of the sections). The Court concluded that Congress intended
the fiduciary obligations of § 206 to be enforceable but questioned use of private litigation
as an enforcement vehicle. See id. at 17-18. The Court granted a limited right of action,
allowing suits under S 215 seeking to void contracts. Id. at 18. The Court reasoned that
§ 215 contemplated the equitable remedy of rescission and restitution of consideration paid
since the section expressly declared contracts in violation of the ICA to be void. Id. By
the very nature of the provision, the court found S 215 implied that private litigation might
be necessary for enforcement of the section. Id. The Court, however, found the analysis
of implication of private rights of action for damages under § 206 to be different since the
Court would have to infer any monetary relief from the IAA. Id. at 19. Finding express
provisions for judicial and administrative enforcement of 5 206, the Court employed a rule
of statutory construction which requires courts to avoid reading remedies into statutes
containing express remedies and refused to add a private enforcement action to the actions
outlined by Congress. See id. at 19-20; Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S.
282, 289 (1929) (Court established rule of statutory construction by which statutory limitation of remedy precludes court addition of other remedies). The Court observed damage
remedies expressly provided in other securities laws and concluded that Congress' omission of any damage remedy from the IAA was a conscious omission and a result of unwillingness to impose monetary liability for IAA violations. 444 U.S. at 20-21; see Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 206, 215, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6, 80b-15 (1976).
444 U.S. at 24; see supra note 59 (analysis of legislative intent in Transamerica).
"See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 14 (1981) (no private right of action implied by Federal Water Pollution Control
Act or Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act for individual fishermen); Texas
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (no private remedy arising
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congressional intent analysis by the Court revived the doctrine of implied
private rights of action. 2 In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc.
v. Curran,' the Supreme Court reiterated the congressional intent test"
but extended the analysis to include an examination of the state of the
law at the time Congress enacted or amended the legislation. 5 In Curran,
customers and futures contract investors brought actions against a commodity futures broker for alleged violations of the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA),66 and the Court faced the question of whether private parties
have an implied remedy for fraud and unlawful price manipulation under
the CEA.8 7 The Court recognized that federal courts routinely allowed
private parties to bring damages actions for violations of the CEA prior
to enactment of amendments in 1974"8 and deemed the practice of implyunder Sherman Act and Clayton Act); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers' Union,
101 S.Ct. 1571, 1580-81 (1981) (implied remedy denied under Equal Pay Act); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 101 S. Ct. 1451, 1461 (1981) (employee denied right of action for
back pay under Davis-Bacon Act); California v. Sierra Club, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1781 (1981)
(no inference of private action from Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899).
In California v.SierraClub, the Court used a pure Cort analysis to find no private
right of action implied by the Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §S401-466g
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). See 101 S.Ct. at 1778-81. The Court found that Congress did not
pass the act for the especial benefit of a class of persons and that no indication of intent
to create a private remedy existed. See id. at 1779-80. The first two parts of the Cort test
having failed, the Court held inquiry into the final two Cort factors to be unnecessary. Id.
at 1781. In other recent cases, the Court has inquired into congressional intent and has
relied less on the four factors articulated in Cort. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n, Inc.
v. Coutu, 101 S.Ct. 1451, 1461 (1981).
" See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1844
(1982) (Supreme Court inferred right of action for damages for violation of Commodity Exchange Act).
" 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).

Id. at 1838-39.
Id. at 1839; see infranotes 69-75 and accompanying text (discussion of "contemporary
legal context" rationale).
" 102 S.Ct. at 1834-35. Four cases were before the Court in Curran.Id. at 1833. In
the first, customers of Merrill Lynch, a futures commission merchant, brought the action
and alleged that the company mismanaged their account, materially misrepresented facts
regarding the opening and managing of the account, made trades for the exclusive purpose
of generating commissions, and refused to comply with the customers' instructions. Id. at
1834. The customers sought recovery under S 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).
Id. at 1834 n.42; see Commodity Exchange Act, § 4b, 7 U.S.C. S 6b (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
In the other three actions, speculators investing in futures contracts sought to recover
from brokers and the New York Mercantile Exchange for price manipulation, fraud, and
violations of rules of the SEC, rules of the Exchange, and SS 4a, 4b, 5(d), 5a(8), and 9(b)
of the CEA. 102 S.Ct. at 1835-36, 1836 n.49; see Commodity Exchange Act, SS 4a, 4b, 5(d),
5a(8), 9(b), 7 U.S.C. SS 6a, 6b, 7(d), 7a(8), 13(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
" Id. at 1836-37.
Id. at 183940. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, amended the CEA. 102 S.Ct. at 1832. The Curranopinion noted
that the amendments were the result of extensive congressional hearings and consideration. Id.
5
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ing private rights of action to be within the "contemporary legal context"
of the CEA19 Because Congress amended a statute from which courts
already commonly inferred a private remedy," the Court's inquiry turned
to an analysis of whether Congress intended to preserve the judicial
remedy existing at the time of the amendments. 71 The CurranCourt concluded that Congress knew of the practice of implying private rights under
the CEA and preserved the practice through silence." The Court held
that congressional re-examination and amendment of the CEA, which left
intact the provisions under which courts inferred a remedy, reflected intent to preserve the implied remedy.73 The Curran decision revived the
theory, apparently put to rest in Touche Ross, that Congress implied a
remedy through congressional review of legislation and subsequent failure
to deny a private right of action.74 The Court held that congressional silence
in light of the common court practice of inferring private rights of action
preserves the implied cause of action. 5
The Curran dissent pointed out that the majority's analysis allowed
the Court to avoid the determination of whether a private remedy should
exist under the CEA. 7' The dissent stressed that the Court should have
" 102 S. Ct. at 1841. In Curran,the Court reviewed the decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), in which the Court inferred a private cause of action
for a woman alleging sex discrimination in denial of admission to a federally assisted school
under title IX of Education Amendments of 1972. Curran,102 S. Ct. at 1839; see Cannon,
441 U.S. at 709. In Cannon,the Court had stressed the importance of considering legislative
intent in the "contemporary legal context" surrounding congressional actions. Curran,102
S. Ct. at 1839; see Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698-99. The Court views the "contemporary legal
context" of a statute or amendment as the existing state of judicial interpretations in the
specific area of law at the time the legislature acts. Curran,102 S. Ct. at 183941; Cannon,
441 U.S. at 689-99. The CurranCourt demonstrated a desire to return to the Cannonanalysis
which relied on the "contemporary legal context." See 102 S. Ct. at 1839-41.
"' Id. at 1839; see supra note 68 (amendment of CEA).
71 See 102 S. Ct. at 1841-44.

Id. at 1844.

See id.
See 442 U.S. at 571. In Touche Ross, the Court departed from the implication approach by which courts inferred a private right of action unless Congress specifically had
denied the remedy. Id. Furthermore, the TransamericaCourt found that express provisions of some remedies accompanied by silence regarding the remedy sought implied intent
to deny the additional remedy. 444 U.S. at 21. The Currananalysis retreats from the strict
approach of Touche Ross and Transamerica,reviving the theory that congressional silence
does not constitute denial of a private right of action in all circumstances. See Curran,102
S. Ct. at 1843-44; see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698-99; supra note 46 (effect of silence on
inference of right of action). Under Curran,silence in the face of a history of implied rights
preserves the right. See 102 S. Ct. at 1843-44. When Congress has the chance to amend
and does not deny specifically the existing implied remedy, the CurranCourt favors an
inference that the right continues with congressional approval. 102 S. Ct. at 1844. The question under the Cur-ranapproach is whether an existing implied private right of action survives congressional amendments. Id. at 1841.
Id. at 1844.
Id. at 1848 (Powell, J, dissenting). The dissent noted that instead of analyzing whether
'
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determined whether the Act implied a private right of action before the
Court could decide that Congress intended to preserve the remedy.Y Pointing out the possibility that courts based earlier CEA decisions on standards to which the Supreme Court no longer adheres in implication cases,
the dissent noted that courts properly could not have held the CEA to
imply a damage remedy under current Supreme Court standards.78 The
dissent viewed the majority's analysis of legislative intent in light of the
current state of the law surrounding the act as a departure from Cort
and other recent implication decisions limiting the focus to congressional
intent.79
The arguments of the Curran dissent carried no weight in a 1983
Supreme Court decision to affirm the existence of an implied right of action for purchasers of registered securities under section 10(b) of the '34
Act." In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, the Court noted a consistent practice in the courts of inferring private damage remedies under
section 10(b) of the '34 Act in spite of an express grant in section 11 of
the '33 Act of a right of action for the same conduct.' Purchasers of
securities in a registered offering may sue because of false or misleading
statements under section 11, but the express section 11 remedy does not
preclude an implied remedy under section 10(b) for fraud in the registration statement.' The Herman & MacLean Court concluded that congressional silence during comprehensive amendments of the '33 and '34 Acts
preserved the inference of a private remedy consistently made by the
federal courts prior to the amendments. The Court cited Curranfor the
the CEA implies a private right of action, the Court erroneously determined that a private
right exists in the CEA's current legal setting. Id.
7 Id. at 1851-52.
,' Id. at 1850-51.
7 See id. at 1848-49; Kaplan, supra note 16, at 63; see also supra notes 25-62 and accompanying text (Cort, Touche Ross, and Transamericadiscussed).
I See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 51 U.S.L.W. 4099, 4101 (January 24, 1983).
Although four justices dissented in Curran,a unanimous Court upheld existence of an implied right of action under S 10(b) of the '34 Act in Herman& MacLean. Id. at 4100. Justice
Powell did not participate in the decision. Id.
"1 51 U.S.L.W. 4099 (January 24, 1983).
' Id. at 4101-02; see id. at 4102 n.21 (cases in which courts allowed action under S
10(b) although S 11 remedies available). In Herman & MacLean, purchasers of securities
brought an action under S 10(b) of the '34 Act, alleging that participants in an offering
defrauded the purchasers by misrepresentations in the prospectus and registration statement. Id. at 4100. Section 10(b) proscribes use of a manipulative or deceptive device in
the purchase or sale of a security. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 10(b), 15 U.S.C. S
78j(b) (1976). Section 11 of the '33 Act grants an express damage action for misstatements
in or omissions from registration statements. Securities Act of 1933, S 11, 15 U.S.C. 5 77k
(1976).
1 51 U.S.L.W. at 4101-02; see supra note 82 (discussion of 5 10(b) of '34 Act and S 11
of '33 Act).
' Id. at 4102. Congress enacted comprehensive revisions to the '33 and '34 Acts in
1975. Id.; see Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97. The amendments did not change 5 10(b) in spite of a judicial tradition of inferring a private right of
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proposition that Congress ratified the judicial decisions inferring a private
cause of action under section 10(b) by leaving the section intact in the
face of a history of implication. 5
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the existence of a
private damage remedy under the ICA, 8 the Transamericacase is helpful
since the TransamericaCourt ruled on the ICA's companion statute, the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA). 7 The strict approach of
Transamericaesuggests that the ICA implies no private damage remedy.
In Transamerica,the Supreme Court found that congressional silence on
existence of private remedies indicated congressional intent to limit enforcement of IAA regulations to the remedies expressly provided by the
act. 9 The Court also noted that Congress provided express remedies in
other securities legislation, a factor the Court believed demonstrated that
Congress intended to imply no private damage remedy under the IAA.1
The Court held that although Congress intended the IAA to benefit investors by protecting them from prohibited fraudulent practices, Congress
intended no implied damage remedy under the act.9'
Congress enacted the ICA and the IAA contemporaneously to impose
analogous regulations on investment companies and investment advisers.'
Like the IAA, the ICA grants no express damage remedy to investors,
except for a limited provision in section 36(b). 3 The ICA, like the IAA,
empowers the SEC to enforce the Act's provisions.94 The Transamerica
approach to implication decisions would warrant a finding that congressional silence with regard to express remedies outside the limited remedies
of section 36(b) indicates legislative intent to exclude other damage
remedies.95 Inclusion of the remedial provision of section 36(b) strengthens
action for individuals injured by fraudulent registration statements. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4102;
see id. at 4101-02 (discussion of purpose of S 10(b) and implication history).
51 U.S.L.W. at 4102; see supranote 84 (amendments and S 10(b) implication history).
Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 1981); see infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text (Fogel discussed).
See Transamerica,444 U.S. at 24. In Transamerica,the Court denied a private damage
remedy for a victim of IAA violations while inferring a limited right of action for equitable
relief. Id.; see supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (Transamericadiscussed).
I See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (Transamerica discussed).
1 444 U.S. at 19-20; see supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text (Transamericaand
Touche Ross discussed).

Id. at 20-21.
91 Id.

at 24.
See Investment Company Act of 1940, SS 1-65, 15 U.S.C. SS 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1976
& Supp. V 1981); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 201-221, 15 U.S.C. §5 80b-1 to 80b-21
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
13 Investment Company Act of 1940, S 42, 15 U.S.C. S 80a-41 (1976); see Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, § 209,15 U.S.C. S 80b-9 (1976); supra note 10 (S36(b) of ICA discussed).
See Investment Company Act of 1940, S 36(b), 15 U.S.C. 5 80a-35(b) (1976). The limited
grant of a private remedy for investors in S 36(b) addresses breach of fiduciary duty with
respect to compensation. See id.; supra note 10 (5 36(b) discussed).
11See supra notes 46, 74 and text accompanying note 89 (effect of congressional silence);
supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (Transamericadiscussed).
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the conclusion under Transamericathat no implied right exists under the
Act because the presence of section 36(b) indicates that Congress considered damage remedies, expressly included the remedy the legislature
intended, and consciously omitted further damage remedies. Under a
strict Transamericaanalysis, a court would have authority for refusing
to infer a private right of action for damages under the Investment Com9
pany Act. 7

The Second Circuit has pointed out, however, that the Transamerica
analysis may not be dispositive of the ICA implication question. 8 In Fogel
v. Chestnutt,99 two shareholders brought a derivative action to recover
brokerage commissions that the investment fund could have recaptured
if the defendants, affiliates of the investment company managing the fund,
had acted properly.0 9 Raising the issue on appeal to the Second Circuit,0 1
the defendants argued that the ICA failed to imply a right of action for
shareholders injured by defendants' violations of the Act.1" The court noted
two important distinctions between the ICA and the IAA in areas relied
on by the TransamericaCourt in denying a private damage remedy. 3
First, the jurisdictional grant of the IAA applies only to actions in equity
while the ICA grant covers equitable and legal actions.0 4 The proposed
jurisdictional section of the IAA originally resembled provisions of other
securities acts, giving the federal courts jurisdiction over suits in equity
and actions at law brought to enforce provisions of the IAA.0 5 Congress
See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976).
' See M.J. Whitman & Co. Pension Plan v. American Fin. Enters., Inc., 552 F. Supp.
17, 22 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (court denied existence of private right of action to compel registration of investment company with SEC); infra notes 133-61 (Whitman discussed).
" See Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 110 (2d Cir. 1981).
668 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1981).
10 Id. at 103. The defendants were the investment company, a successor corporation,
and four directors of the company. Id. The shareholders charged that failure of the company or any affiliate to become a member of two exchanges prevented recapture of the
commissions and other fees at issue. Id.
"' Id. at 105. Fogel first resulted in dismissal on the merits in district court. Id. at
102-03; see Fogel v. Chestnutt, 383 F. Supp. 914, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The Second Circuit
reversed the lower court and held the defendants liable for failure to investigate the possibility of recapture and make full report to the independent directors. 668 F.2d at 102-03; see
Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 749-50 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
The Second Circuit remanded the case for a determination of damages, from which defendants appealed. 668 F.2d at 103.
10 668 F.2d at 105. Defendants first raised the issue of existence of a private cause
of action during the second appeal to the circuit court. Id.; see supra note 101 (discussion
of procedural history of Fogel). The Second Circuit questioned the defendants' right to raise
the issue for the first time during the court's second review of the case. See 668 F.2d at
105-09. The court, however, ruled on the issue and recognized existence of a private cause
of action under the ICA. Id. at 112.
10 Id. at 109-11.
o See id. at 111; Investment Company Act of 1940, S 44, 15 U.S.C. S 80a-43 (1976);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, S 214, 15 U.S.C. S 80b-14 (1976).
1 5 668 F.2d at 109. As the TransarmericaCourt noted, the original jurisdictional grant
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changed the wording, however, and enacted a version that limited jurisdiction to suits in equity to enjoin violations of the act. 1°6 The Fogel court
found that Congress' failure to extend jurisdiction to actions at law1 ' was
an important factor in the Transamericadetermination that nonequitable
private remedies do not exist under the IAA. °8 Second, unlike the IAA,
the ICA expressly states that the Act's purpose is protection of the interests of the public and investors. ' The TransamericaCourt noted provisions for private suits in certain circumstances under other securities
legislation to protect injured investors and relied on the absence of any
such provisions in the IAA to find that Congress intended the IAA to
extend no monetary relief to investors. " Congress, however, allows
damage actions under the ICA."' In light of the significant distinctions
between the acts,"' the Fogel court properly concluded that the Transamerica analysis would not result in denial of a private damage remedy
under the ICA."' The Second Circuit is the only court that has ruled on
of the IAA resembled the ICA grant and included actions at law to enforce any liability
created by the statute. 444 U.S. at 21-22; see S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., §§ 40(a), 203
(1970) (original provisions).
10" 668 F.2d at 109; see Investment Advisers Act of 1940, S214, 15 U.S.C. S80b-13 (1976).
While Transamericadenied a cause of action for damages, the Court inferred a private
right of action for equitable relief under S 215 of the IAA. 444 U.S. at 18; see Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, S 215,15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976); supranote 59 (equitable action allowed).
Section 215 provides that contracts made in violation of the IAA are void, therefore individuals have access to the courts under S 215 to have such contracts rescinded and to
obtain restitution of consideration paid. 444 U.S. at 18; 668 F.2d at 109; see Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, S 215, 15 U.S.C. 5 80b-14 (1976); supra note 59 (S 215 discussed).
107 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (discussion of jurisdiction over IAA
equitable actions). The Transamericaand Fogel decisions noted proposed legislation before
Congress which would have extended jurisdiction under the IAA to actions at law. 444
U.S. at 22-23 n.13; 668 F.2d at 109-10 n.8; see S. 2849, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1976). Neither
House of Congress passed the bill. 444 U.S. at 22-23 n.13.
108 See 668 F.2d at 109-10; see also 444 U.S. at 21-22.
10 See 668 F.2d at 111; Investment Company Act of 1940, S 1, 15 U.S.C. 5 80a-1 (1976);
supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (purpose of ICA).
110See Transamerica,444 U.S. at 20-21; Fogel, 668 F.2d at 110; see also supra note 17
(securities laws discussed).
...
See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. S 80a-35(b) (1976); supra
note 10 (S 36(b) discussed); Transamerica,444 U.S. at 21.
.l.
See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text (differences between ICA and IAA).
...
668 F.2d at 112. The Fogel court turned to Transamericafor guidance in deciding
the question of implied rights under the ICA because Transamericaanalyzed the ICA's
companion legislation, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Id. at 109; see supra notes
52-60 (Transamericadiscussed). The Fogel court looked at the history of implied rights of
action under the two acts. 668 F.2d at 110. The court found that while the ICA had a twentyyear history of implication throughout the courts of appeals, only three circuits had inferred actions under the IAA, those decisions occurring within the two years before Transamerica. Id.; see Transamerica,444 U.S. at 14 n.4 (cases inferring right of action under
IAA discussed); infra notes 123-24 (cases inferring rights of action under ICA). The Fogel
court found these distinctions persuasive enough to make the Transamericaresult inapplicable and found an implied action under the ICA. 668 F.2d at 112.

1084

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1069

the existence of a private right of action for damages in favor of individual
shareholders under the ICA since the Supreme Court announced the
Transamericadecision. " 4
The recent decision in Curranalso diminishes the importance of the
Transamerica approach in the ICA implication question.115 Under the
analysis of the Curran Court, a court must examine congressional intent
in light of the practice of the courts at the time Congress enacts or amends
7
legislation. 16 Like the Commodity Exchange Act at issue in Curran,"
the
ICA has received congressional scrutiny since the Act's passage in 1940.1
By enacting the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970,119 Congress sought to add comprehensive legislation regarding management fees
and commissions and to update the ICA's administrative and enforcement
provisions. 10 The amendments, however, fail to grant or deny a general
'.See Fogel, 668 F.2d at 112; see also supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text (Fogel
discussed). One district court has ruled on the question of existence of a right of action
to compel registration of an investment company under the ICA. See M.J. Whitman & Co.
Pension Plan v. American Fin. Enters., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 17, 22 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (action
denied); infra notes 133-61 and accompanying text (Whitman discussed); see also supra note
10 (consideration of whether investment companies have an implied right of action under
S 36(b) grant to individuals and SEC).
115 See 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982); supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text (Currandiscussed).
11 102 S.Ct. at 1839-41; see supra.notes 65, 69-75 and accompanying text (contemporary
legal context).
11 See 102 S. Ct. at 1827, 1839-41.
Ill See Investment Company Act of 1940, SS 1-65, 15 U.S.C. §5 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1976
& Supp. V 1981). Congress made comprehensive changes in the ICA in 1970. See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); infra note 120 (amendments
discussed).
119 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 80a-1
to 80a-64 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
121See Investment Company Act of 1940, SS 1-65, 15 U.S.C. SS 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1976
& Supp. V 1981); Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84
Stat. 1413 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The
principal stated purpose of the amendments was to define the equitable standards controlling investment companies in relation to advisers and underwriters. Pub. L. No. 91-547,
84 Stat. 1413, supra, at 1413; see S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4897, 4897. The Senate report to Senate bill 2224 stated three
primary objectives of the amendments. S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4898. First, the amendments addressed the problem
of management fees and sales commissions. Id. Second, the bill attempted to clarify the
status of bank and other collection funds under the securities laws. Id. Third, Congress
sought to improve and update administration and enforcement of the ICA and IAA. Id.
In pursuance of the first goal, Congress added S36(b), imposing a fiduciary duty with respect
to compensation and fees paid advisers and affiliates. Id. at 4909; see Investment Company
Act of 1940, S 36(b), 15 U.S.C. S 80a-35(b) (1976). To achieve the second stated goal, Congress
amended existing provisions to clarify the status of bank-administered collective funds and
collective investments offered by insurance companies. See S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4906-08. Congress achieved the
final goal by adopting both technical and substantively significant amendments to the ICA
and IAA designed to improve administration of the acts. See id. at 4908-09. See generally
id. at 4909-43 (explanation and analysis of provisions of bill).
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21
'
right of action for individuals for violations of the Act's provisions.
Neither does the legislative history of the amendments expressly indicate
congressional intent to preserve or eliminate an implied right of action
in investors."
The ICA further resembles the CEA because courts commonly have
held the ICA to imply private remedies for individuals injured by violations of the Act's provisions." Historically, federal courts inferred private
rights of action for the benefit of individuals seeking damages for violations of regulatory sections of the ICA. 4 The rationale that courts used
to infer that the ICA grants a civil right of action to individual security
holders resembled that of the Supreme Court in J.L Case.1" Courts
reasoned that private actions were necessary to supplement the SEC enforcement actions allowed by the ICA.1" Courts afforded a private remedy
in favor of persons showing injuries resulting from activities proscribed
by the Act." Since Congress intended to deter mismanagement of invest'
ment companies for the protection of investors, courts held the ICA to
imply a private cause of action for investment company security holders."
In view of the long-standing practice in the courts of inferring private

.2.
See Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §5
80a-1 to 80a-64 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
12 M.J. Whitman & Co. Pension Plan v. American Fin. Enters., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 17,
21 (S.D. Ohio 1982). See generally S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4897.
123 See 102 S. Ct. at 1939-41 (implied actions under CEA). Circuit courts have held the
ICA to imply private remedies. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 815 (5th Cir. 1970)
(action implied under ICA but no injury to interest protected by Act); Esplin v. Hirschi,
402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir. 1968) (civil liability .implied by ICA), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969); Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815, 819 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965)
(existence of right of action not negated by state law which contradicts ICA provision);
Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472, 476 (3d Cir. 1963) (private right of action
implied); Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 1961) (private remedy implied); see
also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476(1979) (Supreme Court assumed without deciding
that implied derivative action existed under ICA).
12 Fogel, 668 F.2d at 110-11. Every federal court of appeals except the Eighth Circuit
ruling on implication under the ICA has held a private action to exist. Id. at 110; see supra
note 123 (implication decisions of other courts of appeals). The Eighth Circuit originally
refused to infer a private right but later questioned the soundness of the earlier decision,
recognizing the implication decisions of other courts. See 668 F.2d at 110; Greater Iowa
Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 793 (8th Cir. 1967), questioningBrouk v. Managed Funds,
Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot per curiam, 369 U.S. 424 (1962).
225 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (J.L Case discussed).
2 See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 815 (5th Cir. 1970) (court cited J.1. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), and found a private civil remedy necessary to supplement
ICA regulations); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir. 1968) (court relied on J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), to infer civil remedy from ICA).
1 See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 815-16 (5th Cir. 1970) (private right implied
but action precluded because no injury to intended beneficiary of Act).
12 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 816 (5th Cir. 1970); see supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (purpose of Act).
11 See supra notes 123-24 (implication decisions of federal courts).
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remedies under the ICA"' and congressional failure to deny existence of
the remedy when amending the Act,"' the Curran approach leads to a
conclusion that Congress intended to preserve the remedy courts have
inferred from the ICA.'
Only one court has ruled on the existence of a private right of action
under the ICA since the Supreme Court decided Curran."'In M.J. Whitman & Co. PensionPlan v. American FinancialEnterprises,Inc.," the
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied existence of a
private right of action to compel registration as an investment company,"
but limited the holding to actions to compel registration and did not decide
the issue of existence of a private action for damages under the ICA.131
A shareholder of M.J. Whitman brought a derivative action alleging that
the defendants failed to register as an investment company with the SEC
as required by section 7(a) of the ICA." ' The Whitman court followed the
Transamericaapproach, evaluating the ICA legislative history, and found
the ICA implied no right of action for investors to compel registration
of an investment company. ' The court considered the impact of Curran
but concluded that Congress did not intend to preserve an implied right
of action after the 1970 amendments to the Act."39 Noting that the prior
practice of implication was minimal in the area of actions to compel
registration, " " the Whitman court concluded that the contention that Congress recognized and preserved a pre-existing remedy was without merit.'
Because the Whitman decision addressed only actions to compel registration, the case does not control an examination of the existence of private
rights of action for damages. 4 As the Fogel court noted, a tradition of
inferring ICA damage actions exists at common law.' 4 The Curran ap138

See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text (history of inferring private remedy

under ICA).
131 See supra notes 118-22 (legislative history of ICA amendments).
"5 See Curran,102 S. Ct. at 1844. But see M.J. Whitman & Co. Pension Plan v. American
Fin. Enters., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 17, 22 (S.D. Ohio 1982.
13 See M.J. Whitman & Co. Pension Plan v. American Fin. Enters., Inc., 552 F. Supp.
17, 22 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
13 552 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
13 Id.
at 22.
13,
1

Id. at 18.
Id.; see supra note 2 (registration requirements of ICA).
Id. at 19-22; see Investment Company Act of 1940, S 7(a), 15 U.S.C. S 80a-7(a) (1976);

see also supra note 2 (registration requirements).
13 552 F. Supp. at 22; see infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (1970 ICA
amendments).
10 552 F. Supp. at 20. Contra Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 109-12 (2d Cir. 1981);
supra notes 98-114 (Fogel discussed).
141 Whitman, 552 F. Supp. at 20.
1' See Whitman, 552 F. Supp. at 18.
143 See Fogel, 668 F.2d at 110-11; see also supra notes 123-24 (court history of implication
in ICA cases).
144 See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (history of implication).
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proach thus allows a conclusion that the pre-existing damage remedies
courts inferred survive congressional action."5
Apart from the distinction noted between the type of action involved
in Whitman and actions for damages,1" the Whitman case is not controlling because the court misinterpreted aspects of the Act's legislative
history.4 7 The court based its conclusion that the ICA implied no right
of action for investors to compel registration on the absence of evidence
of congressional intent to create a private right of action as a supplement
to the ICA's enforcement scheme."4 8 The court relied heavily on Congress'
inclusion of the express remedy of section 36(b) and omission of any express grant of a right of action based on the Act's regulatory provisions.,
The court's reliance on this factor is inappropriate, however, because Congress added section 36(b) to the ICA as part of a comprehensive attempt
to address problems previously arising under the Act regarding management compensation.1" Congress' purpose in amending the Act was to
eliminate excess and abuse in the setting of fees by investment companies
and their affiliates."1 Congress therefore added provisions creating and
defining a statutory fiduciary duty with respect to compensation and included the express remedy under section 36(b) for breach of the fiduciary
duty regarding fees. 52 Inclusion of such a remedy is consistent with the
amendment's stated purposem and does not indicate an intent by Congress to negate other remedies unrelated to the purpose of regulating fees.
The Whitman court also relied on a portion of the Senate report which
stated Congress' intent that no court interpret by implication the express
grant of section 36(b)1- as affecting SEC actions against investment companies or investment company personnel under section 36(a)1" for breach
of a fiduciary duty unrelated to compensation.'" The court concluded that
the committee's reference to implication of rights of action under section
See Curran, 102 S. Ct. at 1844; supra notes 115-32 (Curranapplied).
m See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (different types of actions).
",See Whitman, 552 F. Supp. at 19-22; infra notes 148-61 (discussion of Whitman analysis).
141

148

See 552 F. Supp. at 22.

See id.; Investment Company Act of 1940, S 36(b), 15 US.C. S 80a-35(b) (1976); supra
note 120 (amendments to ICA).
1 S.REP.No. 91-184,91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 4898, 490942.
" See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat.
1413 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); supra
note 120 (purpose of amendments).
1- See Investment Company Act of 1940, S 36(b), 15 U.S.C. S 80a-35(b) (1976); supra
note 120 (amendments to ICA).
11 See supra note 120 (purpose of amendments).
15 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976) (S 36(b) of ICA).
See id. S 80a-35(a) (§36(a) of ICA).
Whitman, 552 F. Supp. at 21-22; see S. REP.No. 91-184,91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4911; see also Investment Company Act of 1940, SS
36(a), (b), 15 US.C. §§ 80a-35(a), 80a-35(b) (1976); supra notes 8, 10 (express grants of SS 36(a),
(b) discussed).
'
15
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36(a) demonstrated intent to deny all implied rights of action under the
ICA."5 7 The Senate report, however, fails to support the Whitman conclusion. Congress expressly denied that the 1970 amendments allow implication of a private cause of action under section 36(a) but failed to address
an implied right known to exist at common law under other sections. 15 8
By failing to deny the existence of other recognized remedies, Congress
implicitly expressed an intent to preserve the former right of action.159
Whitman concluded that Congress was unaware of the prior recognition
that courts gave private rights of action under the ICA. 6 ' This conclusion
is questionable in light of Curranand inconsistent with Whitman's earlier
recognition of one reference to the implication tradition in the committee
proceedings. ' These factors lead to a conclusion that Fogel adopts the
better analysis of the ICA implication question."
Although the Supreme Court has restricted the doctrine of implied
' the Curran
rights of action in recent years, 63
decision has revived the
argument that courts may continue to infer private damage remedies from
federal regulatory legislation traditionally held to imply such remedies.'"
While the Supreme Court favors denying a private right of action absent
provision of an express remedy, 65 the right of action for damages courts
traditionally have inferred under the ICA should continue.166 In light of
the distinctions between the ICA and the IAA, 67 the common-law history
of implication of private remedies under the ICA, and the "contemporary
9 courts
legal context" approach to legislative intent articulated in Curran,"
should continue to infer a private remedy under the ICA. Curran and
Herman & MacLean indicate that the Supreme Court is retreating from

...552 F. Supp. at 21-22; see S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4911.
11 See S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4911.
119 See Curran,102 S. Ct. at 1841; supra notes 123-29 (tradition of implication). Contra
Whitman, 552 F. Supp. at 22.
" Whitman, 552 F. Supp. at 22.
...See id. at 21; Hearings of Sen. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1969) (letter of SEC commissioner to committee regarding proposed amendments); see
also Curran, 102 S. Ct. at 1841.
" See supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text (Fogel discussed and ICA analyzed).
1" See supra notes 25-62 and accompanying text (Transamerica,Touche Ross, and Cort
discussed).
'" See 102 S. Ct. at 1839-41; see also supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text (Curran
discussed).
"' See supra notes 25-62 and accompanying text (Transamerica,
Touche Ross, and Cort
discussed).
" See supranotes 86-132 and accompanying text (Transamericadistinguished and Curran
applied).
7 See supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text (Transamericadistinguished).
16 See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text (history of implication under ICA).
169 See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text (Curranapproach).
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the stringent implication restrictions of Touche Ross and Transamerica."'
Absent a directive from the Supreme Court returning to the restrictive
analysis,"" courts should continue to find that the ICA implies 7a2 private
right of action for investors injured by violations of the Act.

KATHERINE CARRUTH LINK

170Contra 1981 Term, supra note 26, at 237. One writer has concluded that Curran
continues the restrictive trend in implied right of action decisions. See id While this assessment is accurate with regard to future determinations of whether implied rights of action
exist under legislation never before held to imply such rights, the Curranapproach is less
restrictive than the Court's earlier holdings when applied to legislation previously deemed
to imply private rights of action. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text (Curran's
contemporary legal context approach); supra notes 25-62 and accompanying text (earlier
trend of restricting implied rights of action).
See supra notes 25-62 and accompanying text (restrictive approach).
1
1
See Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1981). Fogel preserved implied
rights of action under the ICA after the Supreme Court decided Transamerica.See id.

